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I. INTRODUCTION

A fairly robust economics literature exists which analogizes patents to real options.
Real options create the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the underlying asset at a
defined exercise price. 1 A patent is like a real option, economists say, because it allows
its owner to choose between exclusively commercializing the patented invention
sometime during the patent term or foregoing commercialization altogether. 2 Economists
have taken this analogy and used real options analysis to place specific values on patents.
A few economics articles have gone a step further, identifying some policy implications
from the real options description of patents. 3
The legal literature is a bit behind in using this analogy. A few scholars have
engaged in the same valuation exercise as economists. Russell Denton and Paul Heald,
for example, previously set forth a state of the art discussion of how to value patents
using options analysis. 4 Shaun Martin, Frank Partnoy, and Michael Abramowicz have
taken the second step, arriving at definite policy conc;lusions based on a real options view
of patents. 5
This Article continues the use of real options in patent law by taking a step back.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the concept of real options and
catalogs the existing economics and law literature discussing patents as real options. The
Article then lays a foundation for previous and future discussions by describing in detail
how patents are like real options. Specifically, Part III. identifies the particular patent
doctrines that make up the common components of a real option-the option price, the
exercise price, the expiration date, and the value of the underlying asset. This descriptive
analysis is a necessary first step in developing a robust theory of patents as real optionsa theory that can have specific patent doctrine implications. Part III also describes how
patents can be defined as a series of embedded options. From here, Part IV discusses
some implications of using real options theory in patent law, and provides a preliminary
taste of the benefits of using real options theory in patent law. Real options analysis
allows both patent problems and patent solutions to be examined in terms of "macro
patent elements"--elements defined by the operational components of a real option. Real
options theory also facilitates viewing patents the same way industry views research and
development projects-as real options. Finally, there is promise in the underlying

I. See, e.g., TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 5
(2001); see also infra Part TI.A (providing a more thorough definition of real options).
2. See, e.g., Rita Gunther McGrath & Atul Nerkar, Real Options Reasoning and a New Look at the R&D
Investment Strategies of Pharmaceutical Firms, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. I, 16-17 (2004); see also infra Part
lI.B.
3. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
4. F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex
Mathematics ofPatent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1203-34 (2003).
5. See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1065, 1073-74 (2007) (discussing uncommercialized patents); Video: Patents as Options (Frank Partnoy &
Shawn
Martin,
Washington
University
in
St.
Louis
2005),
available
at
http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/index.asp?id=l 737#videos
[hereinafter
Partnoy
&
Martin]
(discussing
commercializing innovation). The abstract for the presentation is available at Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law, Abstracts: Commercializing Innovation Conference (Nov. 4-5 2005),
http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/index.asp? id= I 738#partnoy.
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enterprise-using the concept of real options to articulate a new theory of the patent
system.

II. CURRENT LITERATURE ON PATENTS AS REAL OPTIONS
A. Real Options Defined
"A real option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action (e.g., deferring,
expanding, contracting, or abandoning) at a predetermined cost called the exercise price,
for a predetermined period of time-the life of the option." 6 It is called an option because
it gives the holder just that-an option to do something, but not a requirement to act. The
term is modified by the term "real" to distinguish it from a financial option. This means
that the option is on an investment project, as opposed to a financial instrument. 7 Instead
of the options granting the right to buy a stock, bond, or some other underlying security at
a set price during a set time period, a real option concerns the same type of right
regarding a capital investment or project with a more fluid time to expiration. 8 And, as
with financial options, there are "call" real options that give the option holder the right to
purchase the underlying asset at an exercise price, and "put" real options that give the
option holder the right to sell the underlying asset at an exercise price. 9
Examples of financial options abound and are probably the most recognizable. 10
Purchasing the right to buy 100 shares of Microsoft stock at $100 a share over the next
year is a typical financial option. This would be a call option, in that the owner of the
option can exercise the option by actually buying 100 shares of Microsoft stock at $100 a
share during the defined period.
A real option operates in a similar manner, but considers a managerial decision
regarding the allocation of resources. An example of a real option would be the decision
to purchase a fleet of flexible fuel vehicles for your package delivery business. 11 Buying
such vehicles gives your business the flexibility to purchase either gasoline-only fuel or a
gasoline blend with up to 85% ethanol (E85). 12 Such flexibility allows the business to
shift its fuel purchasing based upon the price of regular gasoline and relative fuel
efficiency. In addition, at some time, the options these vehicles provide will become
obsolete. Either E85 is no longer available, and the option expires, or the cost differential
between the two fuels becomes negligible, and the option becomes valueless.
The value of these options-both financial and real-is in the flexibility they
provide. 13 The owner of the option can decide whether they want to buy Microsoft at

6. COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note I, at 5 (2003).
7. Ming-Cheng Wu & Chun-Yao Tseng, Valuation of Patent-A Real Options Perspective, 13 APPLIED
ECON. LEITE RS 313, 314 (2006).
8. Id.
9. LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION I, 4 (1996).
10. Id. at 69-72 (describing a financial option).
11. See, e.g., Flex-Fuel vehicles, http://fueleconomy.gov/feg/flextech.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2009)
(describing flexible fuel vehicles). For a similar example see COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note I, at 13.
12. See LISA RYAN & HAL TuRTON, SUSTAINABLE AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT: SHAPING CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY 41-45 (2007) (discussing flexible fuel vehicles).
13. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at ix-x.
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$100, or purchase gasoline or E85. And the option holder has the full term of the option
over which she may make this decision. This flexibility does come at a price-the price
of the option. Accordingly, real options "giv[e] the investor access to a greater range of
potential outcomes on the upside, while containing the exposure on the downside. This
effectively truncates the left-hand tail of a performance distribution, creating a
performance distribution curve that is skewed to the right, yielding asymmetric payoffs."14 Options therefore become valuable when the value of the underlying asset is
uncertain at the time of the option's purchase.15 The greater the uncertainty over time as
to the value of the asset covered by the option, the more valuable the option. 16 This is
why there is a growing body of literature that suggests managers should consider capital
investments in term of real options. 17
All real options have certain commonalities. As described above, these common
features include a purchase price (the cost of buying the option), an exercise price (the
cost of exercising the option and obtaining the underlying asset), and a time at which the
option expires (an expiration date).18 A call option, with some of these components
labeled, is graphically depicted below.

CallOpdon

Option
Price
Value of Underlying Asset
Figure 1

14. McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 2, at 3.
15. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16-18 (8th ed. 2006) (stating that
"[t]he more uncertain the outlook, the more valuable this flexibility becomes").
16. Id.; A VIN ASH K. DIXIT & ROBERTS. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6-25 (1994).
17. See TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at ix-x (noting that decision makers should consider option-based
approaches for capital and strategic decisions).
18. The time period of the option is also called the time to maturity. See id. at 69 (referring to the specified
date as the expiration or maturity date). Real options are said to have expiration dates. These are rarely defined
calendar dates, but instead are more properly described as expiration conditions-they remain open until a predefined condition becomes true and the option holder must make a decision to either exercise or abandon.
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B. Economics Scholarship on Patents as Real Options

The concept of real options has had "a huge impact on academic research" in
economics. 19 Real options theory has allowed economists to take into account
"management's flexibility to adapt . . . to unexpected market developments"20 when
valuing capital-investment projects.21 This allows one to take the tools financial options
theory provides-mainly valuation tools-and apply them to "real investment
analysis."22 The literature has applied the theory of real options to various forms of
investment activity. 23 The concept appears in many finance textbooks. 24
The main use of real options theory is to value flexibility-that is, the value of
strategic resource allocation decisions. 25 The decisions-essentially the optionsavailable to a company can be characterized as real options and defined in terms of value
by real option elements such as the exercise price or expiration date. Essentially, "[t]he
real options approach seeks to scientifically explain the evaluation of intangible assets."26
For example, using a real options approach, a company can define the value of the ability
to close and then reopen a natural resource mine or the value of purchasing a flex-fuel
vehicle, as discussed above. 27
Real options theory has also been used descriptively-to explain the way in which
companies are behaving. A company's investment behavior can be observed to see if it
falls in line with "real options reasoning" (ROR). 28 That is, real options theory allows an
investigator to determine whether "decision-makers implicitly (or explicitly) respond to
the value of the right to preserve decision rights in the future in their investment
choices." 29
A natural area for economists to apply real options theory, both to value corporate
decisions and to explain them, is technological development. The real option "to [d]efault
during [s]taged [c]onstruction ([a] [t]ime-to-[b]uild [o]ption)" fits most research and
development projects. 30 Research and development of a new technology typically occurs
in stages, with current research facilitating follow-on research and the eventual launch of
a commercial product.3 1 At each stage, the company can default (abandon) the
19. Alexander Triantis, Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?, 17 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2005); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, SS STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2006) (providing further explanation as
to why real options theory has had such a significant impact).
20. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 19, at 1273.
21. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at 1.
22. Steven R. Grenadier, An Introduction to Option Exercise Games, in GAME CHOICES: THE
INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY xv (Steven R. Grenadier ed., 2000).
23. Triantis, supra note 19, at 8.
24. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 19, at 1274.
25. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at xi, 16-20 (detailing the growth in the literature that defines how a real
option is valued, leading to a "transition from a theoretical stage to an application phase").
26. Wu & Tseng, supra note 7, at 313.
27. See COPELAND & ANTIKAVROV, supra note 1, at 17-18 (providing the example of opening and
closing mines).
28. McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 2, at I.
29. Id. at 2.
30. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at I0--11.
31. See MERLE CRAWFORD & ANTHONY DI BENEDETTO, NEW PRODUCTS MANAGEMENT 26-33 (8th ed.
2006) (describing the "phases" of new product development); Robert G. Cooper, A Process Model/or Industrial
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development process.32 An R&D dollar spent today is, essentially, the purchase of a call
option on the resulting technology or future application.3 3 For example, economists have
used real options to value research and development decisions in the pharmaceutical
industry. 34 They have also used ROR to describe retrospectively the research and
development decisions companies make. 35
An outgrowth of the economics literature that looks at research and development
from the real options perspective is the use of real options by economists in the patent
area. The literature starts with the general observation that patents are real options. "In
short, a patent confers on the firm the right but not the obligation to make further
investments, culminating in a decision whether to commercialize its knowledge or not.
Investments made towards commercializing the knowledge underlying the patent are
analogous to the exercise price on the real option."36 The patent allows its holder to delay
decisions regarding the underlying asset-the invention-with little fear that others can
commercialize it. The patentee can:
secure its claim to commercialize this knowledge through patenting.
Subsequently, it may elect to proceed to extend the knowledge, commercialize
its knowledge, to do nothing with it, or to seek or leverage the knowledge in
some other way, for example by sharing it with a joint venture partner or
licensing it out. 37
The literature then consists of economists, armed with this definition of a patent as
real option, valuing patents. Valuation is very specific in some cases. For example,
Prahlad Laxman and Sandeep Aggarwal assigned a specific value to "a real 3G-telecom
patent of Sasken Communication Technologies Limited."38 Other research is more
abstract, either assigning value to protection for a given industry-the pharmaceutical
industry for example-or the value of a patent in general. 39 A commonality amongst
these valuation approaches using real options is the high degree of uncertainty as to the
value of the underlying asset-the invention. 40
There is also a group of articles focusing on patent maintenance fees and whether
the payment or non-payment of maintenance fees provides an indication of patent
value. 41 For a patent to remain enforceable after it issues, the patent holder must pay
13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 2, 2-11 (1983) (articulating a
seven stage development process).
32. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 9, at 10-11.
33. See id. at 341-44 (describing multiple technological development processes as real options).
34. See, e.g., Eduardo S. Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options, 33 ECON. NOTES 23, 24 (2004)
(using real options theory to simulate the value of research and development decisions by pharmaceutical
companies).
35. McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 2, at 16-17.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Prahlad Rao Laxman & Sandeep Aggarwal, Patent Valuation Using Real Options, 15 IIMB MGMT.
REV. 44, 44 (2003). The final value concluded for the company's United States and foreign patents totaled
$8.11 million. Id. at 50.
39. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 34, at 26 (providing a theoretical model of patent value using real
options and then applying the model to data from the pharmaceutical industry).
40. Id. at 24-25.
41. See. e.g., Francesca Comelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND
New Product Development,
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maintenance fees at defined intervals. 42 The articles start from the basis that the
requirement to pay to keep the patent enforceable at various points in time presents real
options. 43 The patentee can either purchase the option to continue the patent right, or
choose not to pay and abandon the patent. The determination to purchase or not purchase
this option, in conjunction with the cost of the option (the maintenance fee), gives an
indication of the patent's value at the time of the option's purchase.44
A few economists go a step further and set forth patent policy insights based on a
real options analysis. For example, some of the articles focusing on patent maintenance
fees suggest how changing patent fee structures can filter out bad patents.45 There is also
an article by Philipp N. Haecker that uses real options analysis to determine the industry
impact of "imperfect patent protection"-that is, patent protection that is not efficiently
enforced or perfectly excluding. 46
C. Law Scholarship on Patents as Real Options

Legal scholars have begun to apply real options analysis to a variety of areas of
law. 47 Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang, for example, applied real options analysis to
the decision to pursue a lawsuit or settle.48 Lee Fennell used real options as the
foundation for a proposed intermediate entitlement that attempts to gain the benefits of
both property and liability rules. 49 There was even a conference at the University of
Virginia in 2004 which focused on real options and the law. 50
Notably, there has been very little legal scholarship using real options theory in
patent law, let alone intellectual property law in general. Some of the legal literature
follows the main thrust of the economics literature-using the general analogy
established by economists and then valuing the patent right. 51 Russell Denton and Paul

J. ECON. 197 (1999); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECON.
181 (1999); Marc Baudry & Beatrice Dumont, Patent Renewals as Options: Improving the Mechanism for
Weeding Out Lousy Patents, 28 REV. INDUS. ORG. 41 (2006); Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates
of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1986).
42. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2000).
43. See, e.g., Pakes, supra note 41, at 755-56 (describing the renewal as an option).
44. See, e.g., id. at 756, 778-80 (attempting to gain insight into the value of patents based on their renewal
rates).
45. See, e.g., Baudry & Dumont, supra note 41, at 60-61 (suggesting an alternative maintenance fee
schedule for policy reasons).
46. Philipp N. Baecker, An Option-Based View of Imperfect Patent Protection (Jan. 10, 2007)
(unpublished research paper, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=907983) (discussing imperfect patent
production).
47. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 19, at 1274 n.23 (cataloging recent legal scholarship using real
options).
48. Id.
49. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1406-10 (2005) (suggesting a
new entitlement regime labeled "entitlements subject to self-made options (ESSMOs)").
50. See generally University of Virginia Law School, John M. Olin Conference on Real Options and the
Law, Oct. 1-2, 2004, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/academics/olin/olin_conference04.htm (providing
information regarding the conference).
51. See Dan L. Burk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Molecular Futures: Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Cathedral, in GENE PATENTS AND CLEARING MODELS: FROM CONCEPTS TO CASES (Geertrui Van
Overwalle ed., forthcoming 2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1359216 (noting the call option nature

1134

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Vol. 34:4

Heald developed a state of the art method for valuing patents using financial options
valuation methodology. 52 They leveraged the patent as options analogy to develop a
version of the Black-Scholes formula, traditionally used to value financial options,
tailored to the particulars of patents in order to price patents. 53 Jerry Hausman, Gregory
Leonard, and Gregory Sidak use real options for a very different purpose-to analyze the
patent infringer's actions and, in turn, critique current patent damages case law. 54
Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy presented "Patents as Options" at a law conference,
with the presentation discussing the real options/patent analogy. 55 Martin and Partnoy
analogize patent rights to real options, particularly a call option-the ability to decide, at
a future date, to exercise the patent exclusivity option to gain exclusive space to
commercialize the claimed invention. 56 They went beyond the general description used
in most economics papers and provided more description of the option price, exercise
price, and expiration. 57 They also provided some important policy implications from this
analysis, which are discussed in detail below. 58 Michael Abramowicz then took Martin
and Partnoy's analysis and applied it to the question of commercialization of the
underlying asset-the invention. 59 I have done the same, using Martin and Partnoy's
analysis to support my recent critique of the early filing nature of the patent system. 60

III. AN INITIAL STEP-DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PATENTS AS REAL OPTIONS
There is clearly an interest in using real options theory in patent law. While most of
the focus is on valuation, there has been some headway-both by economists and legal
scholars-in deciphering the policy implications presented by a real options analysis.
However, a first step is missing from the literature: a detailed description of the analogy
between patents and real options. Many have made the general analogy-describing in
broad terms how operationally a patent, particularly the accompanying right to exclude
and predefined patent term, behaves like a real option. 61 Some have even taken targeted
steps to make this analysis more specific, identifying how a particular patent rule fits
of patent rights); Denton & Heald, supra note 4, at 1194-95 (2003) (detailing the patent/real option analogy).
52. Denton & Heald, supra note 4, at 1203-34 (offering a variation on the Black-Sholes valuation
approach adapted for the peculiar properties of patents).
53. Id.
54. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of
Noninfringing Alternative Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 841--45 (2007).
Viewing the decision to infringe a patent as a real option is troublesome, however, because it relies on the shaky
assumption that infringers make a conscious decision to infringe. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost
Profits from Reasonable Royalties 4 n.13 (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1133173, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1133173 (discussing patent damages).
55. Partnoy & Martin, supra note 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see infra Part III.A. I.
59. Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 1073-74 (2007).
60. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law 44-47 (Feb. 24, 2009) (unpublished
research paper, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=l35321 l).
61. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. Again, this is not to undersell the previous work on
patents as real options, which does a tremendous job in using the concept of option to either nail down the value
of a patent, like in Wallace and Heald's work, or to facilitate a policy discussion, such as in Michael
Abrarnowicz's work.
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within the options framework. 62 But the literature lacks a detailed framework as to what
patent doctrines comprise or impact the various elements of a real option. That is, what
exactly defines the patent's option price, exercise price, expiration date, and underlying
asset value.
For the analogy between patents and real options to fully be exploited by either
discipline-economics or law-there needs to be a complete understanding as to what
elements of patent law make up the operational components of the patent option and
impact its value. This section attempts to take the first step in fully understanding the
patent-real option analogy by providing an explicit description of patents as real options.
A. A Patent's "Option Price"

Every option has a price. One of the first steps in creating a detailed picture of a
patent as a real option is to define the patent's purchase price. The most obvious
component of the patent option price is the fee associated with filing a patent application.
This fee includes a base filing fee and increases with the number of claims in the patent
application. 63 Before one files, a patent application needs to be drafted. While an
inventor can do this herself, an attorney or patent agent is usually hired to draft the
application, increasing the cost of filing, and thus increasing the price of purchasing the
option.64
The price of the patent option also includes the cost of creating the invention. You
need to have an invention before you can file for a patent, and it must be a patentable
invention in order to get a patent. 65 The requirements for patentability define this aspect
of the option price. The inventor must invest the resources to conceive of a new,
nonobvious, and useful invention. 66 This amount of investment-both of time and
capital-varies. It can vary with the technological field-with some technologies, such as
pharmaceuticals, being research and development intensive. Other fields require fairly
low cost to generate a patentable idea (such as computer software and business
methods). 67 There is also a variance in cost depending on the efficiency of the inventor.
Development of patentable ideas also has a randomness to it, with some patentable ideas
being the result of "eureka" moments, requiring very little opportunity cost. 68 However,
62. For example, the literature on patent maintenance fees and real options does this-it looks at a
particular patent concept (the maintenance fee and its structure) and describes and analyzes it under a real
options framework with a focus on patent reform. See supra note 41 (listing examples of relevant articles).
63. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(I) (2006) (setting forth the filing fee for both a regular applicant and a small
entity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(i) (indentifying an extra fee for each patent claim over twenty in an application). There
are other factors that can increase the filing fee, such as the length of the application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(s)
(indentifying an extra fee for a patent application exceeding one hundred pages).
64. Attorneys charge, on average, $9412 to prepare a complex mechanical invention. See AIPLA REPORT
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007 1-79 (hereinafter AIPLA REPORT]. This cost varies with complexity and
technological area. See id. at 1-78 (reporting the average cost for a minimally complex application to be $7012).
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (noting that a patent issues "[i)fit appears that the applicant is entitled to a
patent under the law"); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (indicating that a patent claim must be valid to be
enforced against those who infringe).
66. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
67. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581-83 (2003)
(describing the variation in R&D needed to innovate amongst industries).
68. See id. at 1581 ("Some inventions are accidental or the result of a flash of insight and require
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patent law's patentability requirements focus on the objective, external value of the
invention, not the cost of its development. 69 This makes this component of the option
price extremely variable when attempting to define it in terms of patent rules, but an
element of the option's price nonetheless.
Other patentability requirements influence the cost of the patent option. In general,
the patent system asks the inventor to file early in the development process. 70 The
inventor does not need to physically construct her invention and test it to ensure it
works. 71 She just needs to file a patent application that memorializes her conception of
the invention. 72 The invention also does not need to be so definitely described as to
remove all need for experimentation to implement it. 73 The inventor also does not need to
demonstrate a commercially viable use for the invention. 74 The invention just needs to be
theoretically operable. 75
There is another cost in addition to filing costs and the cost of inventing-the cost of
losing trade secret protection. The patent system requires public disclosure of the
patented invention. 76 An application is secret when filed, but once it is published 18
months from filing, the information regarding the invention is available to all. 77 The
patent requirements also mandate that the inventor disclose the "best mode" of practicing

essentially no research budget.").
69. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 379 (2002) ("The Patent
Act is designed not to reward labor or financial investment that leads to a new discovery or a slight modification
of a preexisting object or process, but to reward new and useful creations of the human mind, regardless of the
labor or financial investment involved.").
70. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1977)
("The second important feature of the patent system which makes it function as a prospect system are rules
which force and permit application early in the development process.").
71. See Lawson v. Bruce, 222 F.2d 273, 278 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (noting that an inventor is not required to
"show a specific working example" of the claimed invention to be the first to invent it).
72. This is the constructive reduction to practice doctrine, in which a properly disclosed invention in a
patent application acts as a substitute for actually making and testing the invention. See Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ('"Constructive reduction to practice' is a legal
status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules for scientific publications, which require actual performance of
every experimental detail, patent law and practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can be
practiced.").
73. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the specification does
not need to "necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the
artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between
embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the
predictability of the art").
74. Kitch, supra note 70, at 269 (''The patent application need not disclose a device or process of any
commercial value, only a version of the invention that will work.").
75. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The threshold of
utility is not high."); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("To violate§ 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result.").
76. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings ofPatent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 267 (1994)
("On issuance, a patent communicates a considerable amount of information that can help other would-be
inventors, including rival firms.").
77. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000). An applicant can elect not to publish before issuance. Id. However, the
patent, once issued, is available to everyone for inspection. Id.
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the invention. 78 These two factors-public disclosure of the invention and the best mode
requirement-work together to force patent applicants to choose patent protection over
trade secret protection. 79 The intellectual property system channels inventors to one
protection regime or the other. 80 Losing trade secret protection is one of the opportunity
costs of patents.
To summarize, the option price of a patent is composed of the filing fees and
attorney fees associated with filing the patent application, the cost of inventing the
underlying invention, and the benefits of trade secret protection that are lost.

B. A Patent's "Exercise Price"
The next step is to determine the exercise price of the patent option. To define this
price, we first need to identify how exactly a patent option is exercised. Patents provide
essentially one right-the right to exclude.81 So, any exercise of the patent must
necessarily involve the exclusion of other companies making, using, or selling the
claimed invention.
When scholars talk about exercising the patent option, they usually focus on the
commercialization of the underlying asset-the invention-by the patent holder. 82 While
this does not involve the patent right directly, the assumption is that the patent plays a
role by clearing shelf-space for the commercialization. 83 This exclusive use of the
invention allows the patent holder to commercialize the invention and sell it at a supracompetitive price. 84
Use of the patent option in this way requires the patentee to finish the development
of the invention to get it to market. Given that patent law does not require much pre-

78. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ~ 1 (2000) ("The specification ... shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.").
79. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § l (1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40
(1995) (noting the requirement of secrecy to obtain trade secret protection); Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc.,
301 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("If an inventor does not disclose a critical trade secret within the best
mode requirement, that nondisclosure puts the value of the entire patented invention at risk-a risk beyond the
requirements of§ 112."). This mutual exclusivity applies only to the claimed invention. Id. Aspects of the
technology not claimed can remain a trade secret. Id.
80. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1974) (holding that this mutual
exclusivity supports the conclusion that "patent law does not pre-empt trade secret law").
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (stating that "whoever ... makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" a patent
without right "infringes the patent").
82. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5; Schwartz, supra note 34, at 48 (analyzing how to value research
and development projects in regard to patents, and how research and development projects can affect the value
of patents).
83. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report From the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1627, 1672 (2007) ("Patents are surely playing a role in the age-old battle over 'shelf space' in this competitive
industry.").
84. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 444, 450-51 (2d
ed. 1980). This is not always the case, because the patent may not provide the protection required to keep
market substitutes out. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78
(1965) (noting that "[t]here may be effective substitutes for the [patented] device which do not infringe the
patent"); William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell
Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1158 (2004) (discussing why a monopoly caused by a patent is an
inefficient arrangement).
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patenting development, 85 the patentee may need to expend significant resources, both to
further refine the invention and to establish production and distribution facilities
necessary for commercialization. 86 The exercise price includes the cost to commercialize.
The exercise price also includes any policing costs needed to maintain exclusive use
of the invention. The patentee may need to send letters to potential infringers and, if
required, initiate legal action to enjoin those who are infringing the claimed invention. 87
The patent rules that govern assertion of the patent right-both substantive and
procedural-impact this part of the exercise price. 88 This part of the exercise price is also
influenced by the remedies available, given that remedies both influence potential
infringer's activities and impact the effectiveness of policing activities. 89
Without commercialization by the patent holder (or someone standing in her shoes
such as a licensee), the value of the patent drops because the patentee can no longer
charge supra-competitive prices due to the entrance of infringers into the market. In turn,
if the patentee does not police and try to exclude others when commercializing, she is not
exercising the patent option-she is simply commercializing. Such enforcement costs
combine with the cost of commercialization to make up the exercise price of the patent
option.
There is another way to exercise the option that was recognized by Martin and
Partnoy-assertion of the exclusivity right against another company who has
commercialized.90 Here, the exclusivity the patent provides is not being used to assist in
the patent holder's commercialization. Instead, the patentee is using the patent right to
extract rents from someone else.91 Such an exercise can range from simply engaging in
licensing negotiations with a potential infringer to litigating a patent infringement claim
to final judgment. Anything falling within this spectrum is an assertion of the patentee's
right to exclude. 92
The cost of exercising an option in this manner differs from exercising by
commercialization. As Martin and Partnoy recognized, the assert-only exercise price is
much cheaper. 93 Instead of making the capital investments necessary to commercialize
an invention and bring it to market, the patentee just needs to expend the resources to
identify and successfully enforce the patent. While certainly not costless-with a fullblown patent litigation ranging in the multi-millions of dollars in cost 94-assertion does
85. See supra notes 65--66, 71-75 and accompanying text (describing the patentability requirements).
86. See Cotropia, supra note 60, at 54 (showing, in Figure 3, the difference in the development prior to
patenting and thus required after patenting to commercialize the invention and exercise the option); Martin &
Partnoy, supra note 5.
87. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 64, at 25-26.
88. See, e.g., Jonas McDavit, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Obstacles to Using Issue Preclusion in a
Post-Markman World, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 45, 46 ("In the years since Markman, district courts have used minitrials, or 'Markman hearings," to determine the construction of patent claims. Markman hearings can involve
considerable time, cost, and effort by plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts.").
89. See, e.g., Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 235, 250 (2006) (stating that the reduction in permanent injunctions after the eBay decision will
make patent enforcement more difficult because large corporations now have less incentive to license).
90. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5.
91. Id.

92. See supra note 82.
93. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5.
94. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 64, at 25-26 (noting that total costs through trial were $2.992 million
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not involve the tremendous costs of commercialization. 95 And litigation costs, once paid,
are extinguished as compared to production plants and long-term distribution contracts
that a patentee must continue to pay for even if the commercialization is a bust. Litigation
costs are simply that, costs, which carry little to no ongoing obligation once the costs are
paid. The opportunity costs are less as well. It takes a tremendous amount of company
focus to bring a product to market. 96 A litigation, or even an aggressive licensing
program, involves less manpower, is less likely to pull business units off-track, and can
be outsourced to private law firms.97
A final point on the comparison between the two exercise prices is that exercising by
commercialization could also include the full cost of assertion. As mentioned, to take full
advantage of the patent right when commercializing, some level of assertion of the patent
right may be required to keep the market clear for the patentee's product. This fact makes
the difference in exercise price even greater-with commercialization requiring the
exercise price of assertion plus the cost of commercialization. The two exercise pricescommercialization and assertion-are depicted graphically below.

_,,
Assert

~,'

,

,
,

'

Option
Price
Value of Patent Right {Right to Exclude)
Figure 2
C. A Patent's "Expiration Date"

The expiration of the option is initially tied to the expiration of the patent. The
patent expires, by statute, 20 years from the filing date of the patent. 98
A patent can, however, de facto expire when the breadth of exclusivity the patent's
claims provide has no value. 99 "Other products or processes may enter the market during
in 2001, $3.995 million in 2003, $4.500 million in 2005, and $5.000 million in 2007).
95. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5.
96. See, e.g., MERLE CRAWFORD & ANTHONY DI BENEDETIO, NEW PRODUCTS MANAGEMENT 26-35 (8th
ed. 2006) (detailing the five typical phases ofnew product development).
97. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5.
98. 35 u.s.c. § 154 (2000).
99. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 171-72 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, After-Arising] (explaining that a patent can de
facto expire when replacement products do not fall within the patent's scope, requiring the patent holder to
compete with the substitute product); Ted O'Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of
Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2-4 (1998).
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a patent's statutory life that act as substitutes for the patented invention." 100 A good
example of expiration prior to the end of the patent term is when a patented technology
becomes obsolete and is replaced by a technological advance. A patent covering aspects
of audio-tape players, while probably not expired, is of little to no practical value because
there is little or no demand for audio-tape players. IOI The technology has been
completely replaced by compact discs and solid-state audio players (such as mp3
players). The patent has not technically expired, but since the exclusivity is irrelevant to
the market demand, the patent holder can no longer dictate market price, and thus the
patent has de facto expired. I02
Substitution, and the accompanying de facto expiration, can also occur because the
substitute falls outside the patent's claim scope. 103 Such an occurrence is less likely the
larger the patent's claim scope.104 The larger the claim scope-the greater swath of
technology the patent grants exclusivity over-the longer the patent's exclusivity remains
relevant to the market. The broader the patent scope, the more substitute products the
patentee has power over, and thus the later the patent "expires."105
Patent breadth, which is a component of the expiration date of a patent option, is
influenced by various patent doctrines. Obviously, the breadth of the patent's claims is
influenced by independent factors such as the patent drafter's decisions in writing the
claims and the particulars of the invention. However, the requirements of enablement and
written description govern how constrained the patent's scope is by the particular
examples and descriptions in the patent's specification. 106 The doctrine of equivalents
also allows patent scope to grow to cover "equivalents" to what the patent literally claims
and to cover after-arising technologies. 10 7 The particulars of claim interpretation also
play a substantive role in determining patent breadth. I0 8 Put simply, elements of patent
doctrine also define how soon a patent option expires because the doctrine impacts the
breadth of patent exclusivity.
These two components-the patent's statutory life and the patent's scope--comprise

100. Cotropia, After Arising, supra note 99, at 171.
IOI. See, e.g., John Manning, Tape Echo: Specialty Labels Keep Cassettes Alive, BILLBOARD MAG., Oct.
11, 2008, at 19 (noting that most tape sales are now "off the grid").
102. See Cotropia, After Arising, supra note 99, at 172 ("While the patent has not technically expired, it has
effectively expired because the exclusivity that the patent provides is now worthless in the marketplace.").
103. Id. ("Non-infringing substitutes impinge on the market power that the patent holder enjoys in the area
of the patented technology. While the patent has not technically expired, it has effectively expired because the
exclusivity that the patent provides is now worthless in the marketplace.") (footnotes omitted).
104. Id. at 172-73 ("A patent's breadth defines the universe of products or activities that cannot replace the
patented technology during the patent's statutory lifetime.").
105. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) [hereinafter Scotchmer, Standing] (noting how the "breadth of patent
protection is a key consideration in the incentives to innovate").
I06. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, if I (2000) (stating the required contents of the patent specification); see, e.g.,
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (limiting the patent's scope
because the claimed invention was not properly described in the patent specification).
I07. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1996) (discussing the
breadth of the doctrine of equivalents); Cotropia, After-Arising, supra note 99, at 157-59.
I08. See Christopher Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope
Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARYL. REv. 49, 65--69 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, Patent Claim] (explaining the
procedure for determining the scope of patents).
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the patent's life and thus define its expiration date. 109 There are really no other patent
doctrines that change the patent option's expiration date. An invalid patent expires
early, I IO but such patents should never have been issued in the first place. The option
does not necessarily expire as it was invalid ab initio. 111 Inequitable conduct, which
renders a patent unenforceable, operates in a similar manner as invalidity--concluding
that activity by the patentee prior to the patent's issuance (failure to disclose material
prior art, for example) made the patent expire. 11 2 Patent misuse, in contrast, focuses on
actions post-issuance that can render a patent unenforceable. 113 If the patentee uses her
patent in an anti-competitive manner, she is not allowed to enforce it against anyone.114
This is an expiration of sorts-however, the patent may become enforceable yet again
once the misuse is expunged.115

D. Value ofAsset Underlying the Patent
Another important part of a real option is the value of the underlying asset.
Valuation of the underlying asset, as well as the volatility in its value, is an important
factor in assigning a value to the real option.
The underlying asset in the case of patents is the claimed invention. The patent
claims erect boundaries around a described technology that the patentee can exclude
others from practicing. 11 6 The value of this underlying asset is mostly independent of
patent rules. The invention is the invention, and the market sets its value. Patent law's
lack of interest as to the commercial value of the patented invention is intentional. 1l 7
There are, however, patent rules that provide some insight into the value of the
underlying asset. Patent law has a utility requirement that is fairly lax. l 18 Although the
utility requirement does not require evidence of commercial worth, it does ask if the
invention is at least operable-that it at least theoretically will work. l 19 In some cases,

109. Cotropia, After-Arising, supra note 99, at 171.
110. 35 u.s.c. § 282 (2000).
l l l. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (noting that
future accused infringers can raise "a plea of estoppel" to defend "a charge of infringement of a patent that has
once been declared invalid").
112. See 37 C.F.R. § l.56 (2006) (describing the type of information a patent applicant is under a duty to
disclose); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (setting forth the three basic
elements of inequitable conduct-materiality, non-disclosure, and intent).
113. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942) (enforcing the misuse
doctrine); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (citing the misuse doctrine when refusing to extend a
patent).
114. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32-34.
115. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492-93.
116. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (noting that a claim in
a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right that the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the protected invention).
117. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 439, 453 (2004)
("Simply put, patent law has no aversion to awarding commercially worthless property rights.").
118. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The threshold of
utility is not high."); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("To violate § I0I the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result.").
119. Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1571 ("If the claimed subject matter is inoperable, the patent may indeed be
invalid for failure to meet the utility requirement .... ").
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the utility inquiry is applied more stringently, asking in chemical and biological cases
whether there is a specific use for the invention. 120 This heightened utility requirement
makes the inventor better define the value of the invention and also decreases the
uncertainty surrounding its value.
Various aspects of the nonobviousness doctrine also provide a window into the
value of the underlying asset. The doctrine does not require a particular amount of
investment in the invention's creation or that there is a defined commercial demand for
the invention.121 However, some of the secondary considerations that are used to
establish nonobviousness address the invention's value. Facts such as the commercial
success of the invention and its long-felt need in the industry, both of which rebut a prima
facie case of obviousness, speak to the value of the invention. 122 Also, the general theory
behind nonobviousness attempts to measure the technical advancement reflected in the
invention-which has some relationship to value. 123
There is also interplay between patent rules that impact the patent's scope and the
value of the underlying asset. Basically, patent rules that allow the patent's breadth to
expand-such as the doctrine of equivalents-increase the value of the underlying
asset. 124 The more products and processes covered by the patent, the more technology is
considered part of the option's underlying asset. The opposite is also true. Doctrines that
minimize scope-such as the disclosure requirements-have the opposite effect on the
underlying asset's value, minimizing the amount of technology covered and limiting
value.125
E. Additional Complexity-A Patent as a Series ofEmbedded Options

The description of a patent as an option can become even more sophisticated. As
recognized by at least one pair of economists, the patenting process itself is a series of
embedded options.126 The inventor, at many points during the patenting process, can
either continue pursuing the patent or abandon it. The inventor can initially file a
provisional patent application, which is not examined and not required to contain any
claims. 127 Then, to gain the early filing date of the provisional application, the inventor
must decide within a year whether to convert the provisional application to a non120. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (evaluating the substantial utility of a
product); Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 1644-45 (explaining the utility requirement for patents).
121. Damaine & Fellmeth, supra note 69, at 379 (summarizing the objectives of the patent act).
122. "These secondary considerations include evidence of commercial success, fulfillment of a long-felt but
unsolved need, licensing to potential competitors, copying by an infringer, progress of the patent application
through the Patent and Trademark Office, near-simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, and
professional approval by experts in the field." Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary
Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REv. 357, 366
(1987).
123. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentlary Lens: The "Suggestion Test" as
a Rule ofEvidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1517, 1525-26.
124. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (determining that
Hughes's patent claims could capture a later developed technology under the doctrine of equivalents).
125. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing
patent scope limitations).
126. See Laxman & Aggarwal, supra note 38, at 44-45 (discussing the evaluation of an option).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 11 l(b) (2000) (defining the provisional application).
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provisional application. 128 This decision point-to convert or not-can be viewed as the
expiration of an earlier option-the provisional application option-and the ability to
purchase a new option-a non-provisional application option. The purchase of this
following option includes the cost of drafting patent claims and getting the application
ready for examination in generat 129
The patent process then presents another series of options. For example, the inventor
must decide, perhaps multiple times, whether to respond to the examiner's office
rejection of the patent application or to abandon the application altogether. BO The filing
of continuations-requests to continue examination-and continuing to pursue the
current patent claims or add new ones is another discrete option. 131
Laxman and Aggarwal recognized that there are another series of embedded options
with regards to a patent application when examining the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
system. 132 The inventor not only gets many opportunities to elect whether to continue
pursuing her U.S. patent application; she also has the option to seek patent protection in
other countries, which is typically facilitated through the PCT system.133 The PCT
system consists of multiple stages, each of which requires the inventor to elect to
continue with international examination. 134 The PCT system ends with the applicant
needing to elect which countries to "nationalize" the patent application in-that is, filing
a patent with that particular country. 135 These choices can also be viewed as a series of
options, where at each point the applicant can either abandon, or narrow, the process of
obtaining a patent or proceed unchanged. 136
Even when the patent issues-either in the United States or in a foreign countrythe patentee is faced with further options. Most countries employ a patent renewal system
where the patent holder must pay fees at defined time periods to keep the patent
128. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § l 19(e) (2000); 37 C.F.R. § l.53(c) (2006); Robert A. Migliorini, Twelve Years Later:
Provisional Patent Application Filing Revisited, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 437, 441-42 (2007).
129. See infra Part III.A (describing these costs).
130. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132-33 (2000) (setting forth the statutory restrictions on the patent examination
process).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Continuations, 84
B.U. L. REV. 63, 67--69 (2004) (explaining the continuation process). Regulations have been passed to limit the
availability of continuations. See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Application
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
46716-46843 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). The rules are, however, currently enjoined
from being implemented. See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 671 (E.D. Va. 2007).
132. See Laxman & Aggarwal, supra note 38, at 45-50 (explaining the PCT system).
133. Patents can be obtained in other countries by other means than going through the PCT process. See,
e.g., Marco T. Connor & Lin Yasong, How to Get Patent Protection in Europe?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'v 169, 172-73 (2008) (noting four different ways to obtain patents in Europe, two of which do not
involve PCT applications).
134. See T. David Reed, Strategic Use of the PCT, A Discussion.from the User's Perspective 8-9 (Oct. 8,
2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pctlen/pct_strategies/strategic_use_reed.pdf
(depicting the PCT process as a timeline including a series of actions by the PCT applicant and the relevant
examining authority).
135. Id.; World Intellectual Property Organization, PCT Applicant's Guide-National Phase-National
Chapter 2 (2008) available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/guidelen/gdvol2/pdf/gdvol2.pdf (describing the national
phase as "the second of the two main phases of the PCT procedure").
136. See Laxman & Aggarwal, supra note 38, at 45-50 (noting that the PCT application process contains
"many embedded options").
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enforceable. 13 7 These payment points are called maintenance fees in the United States
and they increase exponentially in price the deeper one gets into the patent's term. 138 As
mentioned previously, this discrete set of options has been the focus of a number of
economists. 13 9
IV. BENEFITS TO DESCRIBING PATENTS AS REAL OPTIONS
The obvious question is "who cares?" An arbitrage of sorts has occurredsomething that contemporary legal scholars do quite frequently-taking a concept from
another discipline and applying it to an area oflaw.
My initial response is that, at least here, some people have already showed they care
by writing articles and citing others that discuss patents as real options. 140 There is
evidence of "care" on both sides of the aisle-however, it is much more so on the
economics side than the law side. So, Part III of this Article, detailing the analogy
between patents and real options, should help both of these camps continue the discussion
of patents as real options.
To further answer the "who cares?" question, this section provides some thoughts on
why the analogy-and thus further nailing down the specifics of the analogy-matters.
A. Defines New "Macro Patent Elements"

Patent law is made up of a myriad of patent rules. There are rules for patentability,
typically viewed as a series of filters that a patentable invention passes through as
unpatentable subject matter is trapped. There are also rules governing enforcement of
patents and rules defining defenses. These rules all have their own operational
definitions. For instance, what is the nonobviousness requirement and what happens if it
is not met? What is the importance of a patent claim, what does it define, and how does
one interpret it?
These rules are interrelated. They influence one another in technical ways. For
example, patent claims must be interpreted first before questions of validity or
infringement can be decided. Why? Because the patent claim defines the subject that is at
the center of each of those inquiries. 141 Individual patent rules can also influence one
another substantively. A good example of this is the prerequisite that a patent claim be
valid before it can be enforced. 142 Standards of patentability also necessarily have an

137. See 37 C.F.R. § l.20(e)---{g) (2008) (providing the fee structure "[f]or maintaining an original or
reissue patent").
138. Id. (reciting fees at 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years into the patent term).
139. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting articles focusing on maintenance fees).
140. See supra Parts II.B, II.C (noting previous scholarship in the law and economics field).
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ii 2 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention."); White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) ("The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the
very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is.").
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing that the invalidity of a patent can be used as a defense against
"action[s] involving the validity on infringement of a patent"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d
1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("To win on its claim of patent infringement, [the patentee] must present proof that
[the infringer] infringed a valid and enforceable patent.").
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impact on the scope of exclusivity a patent provides.143
There is a benefit to recognizing these interrelationships. For example, do various
patent rules work together or against one another in the breadth of protection that a patent
provides? Seeing these interrelationships helps in identifying the causes of problems with
the patent system. A patent problem may be recognizable at a general level; for instance,
the patent right is too strong. But to determine the problem's exact cause, understanding
the doctrines that impact patent "strength" helps to identify what patent rule can be
changed to correct the policy failure. Recognizing interrelationships also helps identify
how particular changes to individual patent rules can work together, or against each
other, as to their impact on the patent system.
Describing patents as real options, specifically focusing on the few components that
make up a real option, identifies these interrelationships between individual legal rules by
aggregating them. Part III of this Article identifies these "macro patent elements"-the
various components of a real option-and describes the specific patent rules that make up
each macro element. For example, the macro patent element-"the patent option's
price"-is comprised of a variety of patent doctrines, from the mundane (such as filing
fees) to the complex (such as the nonobviousness doctrine). 144 By focusing on a patent's
option price, exercise price, expiration date, and underlying asset value, an inquiry into
patent law can focus on broader elements while not losing the particular patent rules in
play.
To better exemplify how the patents as real options analogy provides access to these
macro patent elements, both a current problem with the patent system (the existence of
patent trolls) and an arguable solution (the nonobviousness standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, lnc.) 145 are viewed through the
options framework. By doing this, the Article demonstrates that real options theory can
abstract the particular causes of a patent problem (here the patent troll problem) and
identify the broader impact of a specific patent solution (here the raising of the
nonobviousness standard) via macro patent elements. By doing so, the problem and
solution are placed in the context of the larger patent system and become easier to
understand, both in their own right and within the patent system as a whole.

I. Patent Troll Problem in Option Terms
The patent troll problem, put succinctly, is that patents are being held by individuals
who have no intention of commercializing the invention and instead use patents to extract
rents from those who have commercialized. 146 This type of activity is problematic
because the patent is acting solely as a tax on innovation. 147 The patent is not generating
143. See Whittaker Corp. v. UNR Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[C)laims are generally
construed so as to sustain their validity, if possible."); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &
Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[A) patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of
equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.").
144. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the elements in the patent's option price).
145. KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
.
146. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to Brief ofAmicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 997 (2006) (defining '"patent troll"' as "non-producing, non-research and
development (R&D) performing patent holders").
147. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 5
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societal welfare because its holder has not, and has no plans to, commercialize the
claimed technology.148 Instead, the patent holder uses the patent to delay those who are
innovating for the sole purpose ofreceiving a monetary reward.1 49
Many have opined as to why these individuals-labeled "patent trolls"-engage in
such activity. ISO The causes of the patent troll problem can be put in terms of real
options.

a. Too Low an Option Price
First, as I argue elsewhere, the option price of a patent is too low, when viewed in
the context of commercialization of the patent. IS! The inventor, under the current patent
rules, needs to engage in very little development activity to obtain a patent. Patent law
does not require the inventor to actually reduce the invention to practice. IS2 The
invention need not be physically made or implemented. In addition, the inventor does not
need to test the invention prior to patenting to determine whether it works for its intended
purpose. In fact, there are other patent rules-the statutory bar and the presumption that
the filing date is the invention date to name a couple-that push the inventor to file for
patents early in the development process. IS3
Development costs money and time. The less development that needs to be done to
get a patent, the cheaper the patent and the lower the option price. IS4 This low option
price fosters patent trolls. A company like Intellectual Ventures, whose sole purpose is to
generate patents, is able to produce more patents because less investment is needed on the
front end. 1S5 The cheaper the patent option, with all other elements influencing value
remaining constant, the more likely it will be purchased.156
Here is an example of the aggregation facilitated by options theory: The option price
is a macro patent element. Under one element of an option-the purchase price-the
interaction of a number of individual patent rules can be combined---constructive
reduction to practice doctrine, utility requirement, statutory bar, etc. The current level of
this macro patent element-the option price---contributes to the patent troll problem.
(2005) (noting that "[m]any of today's most popular and pervasive technologies have already felt the sting of
patent trolls").
148. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2006).
149. See Merges, supra note 146, at 997 (noting that patent trolls do not seek to produce products or
perform research and development).
150. For example, I have argued elsewhere that the early filing nature of the patent system creates patent
trolls. Cotropia, supra note 60, at 57-59.
151. Id. at 52-53 (commenting that the "potential value of the option" is "quite high" when compared to the
"relatively inexpensive" cost of the patent application).
152. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (noting that a patent does not require an actual
embodiment).
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (establishing the statutory bar to patentability); Cotropia, supra note 60,
at 16-20 (noting these incentives).
154. See supra Part III.A.
155. Intellectual Ventures-Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.intellectualventures.com/Faq.aspx
(last visited Mar. 29, 2009) ("IV's [Intellectual Venture's] invention efforts center on 'invention sessions' which
are multidisciplinary brainstorming events focused on a particular set of issues and possible solutions. IV
typically hosts several 1-2 day invention sessions per month.").
156. See COPELAND & ANTIKAVROV, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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b. Too Low an Exercise Price

Another element of the patent option also explains patent troll behavior. Patent trolls
exercise the patent option by asserting the patent right against others who have
commercialized the patented invention. Patent trolls-as the alternative label "nonpracticing entity" suggests-do not exercise the option by commercializing the invention
themselves. It is this choice when exercising the option that draws patent trolls such
criticism.1S7 By exercising through assertion, as opposed to commercialization, the patent
troll appears to be solely a drag on innovation.ISS
A potential cause of this problem is the comparative low cost of the assertion
exercise price to the commercialization exercise price. Recognized by Martin and
Partnoy, and further described earlier in this Article (specifically Figure 2), it is simply
cheaper to exercise the patent option by asserting than by commercialization.159 Faced
with this stark difference in exercise prices, exercising the option by assertion-and thus
acting like a patent troll-becomes the favorable way to use a patent. This low exercise
price is another macro patent element that can be identified as a contributory cause of a
current patent problem-patent trolls.
2. KSR and a Heightened Nonobviousness Standard in Option Terms

The opposite perspective can also be taken when looking at these macro patent
elements defined by the real options analogy. A specific patent law change can be
examined as to how it affects one of the elements of the patent option, that is, how a
particularly legal change impacts a macro patent element.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.160
arguably changed the nonobviousness doctrine. The decision in KSR potentially
heightened the standard for nonobviousness from that previously articulated by the
Federal Circuit.161 The case raised the bar for what types of inventions qualify for patent
protection by expanding the basis upon which one can find an invention obvious.162
Instead of requiring a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art to render the
invention obvious, common sense and market demand, among other factors, can also be
relied upon to establish a finding of obviousness.163 In addition, the case identifies those
inventions whose results are predictable as unpatentable due to obviousness.164 This
change narrows the universe of inventions that can obtain patent protection.165
157. See Brief for Yahoo! As Amicus Curie Supporting Petitioner at 2-3, 6-7, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (commenting that as non-practicing entities, trolls have little
incentive to cross-license and, due to the cost of trial, even companies with excellent defenses have a strong
incentive to settle).
158. Id.
159. See supra Part III.B; Martin & Partnoy, supra note 5 (arguing that existing policy favors litigation to
commercialization).
160. KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
161. Id. at 418-22.
162. C. Paul Wazzan, The Effects ofKSR v. Teleflex on Patent Licensing Costs, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. mi
7, 14 (2007), available athttp://www.lawtechjoumal.com/articles/2007/04_071228 _wazzan.pdf.
163. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-22.
164. Id. at 419-22.
165. Wazzan, supra note 162, mi 7, 14; but see Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the
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A change in the patentability requirement necessarily changes the patent option's
price. One component of the price is the cost of coming up with the invention.166 The
higher the standard of patentability, the more that needs to be done to obtain protectionand thus purchase the patent option. Admittedly, an inventor may surreptitiously come
upon a nonobvious invention, but generally the view is that nonobvious inventions are
those that need the incentives in patent protection to prompt their creation. 167 The
invention needs the potential of supra-competitive profits to prompt its creation because
the creation process is so costly and uncertain. 168 The standard in KSR increases the
amount of cost and uncertainty that needs to be involved for an invention to obtain patent
protection. 169 Arguably, there has to be less indication from the current state of
knowledge that there is such an invention out there and that even creating it will produce
predictable results. This heightens the costs of patenting, which also increases the costs of
the patent option. A macro patent element-option price-is impacted by this specific
doctrinal change.

B. Describes Patents Like Industry Views Technological Development
The other benefit to describing patents as real options is that it frames the patent
discussion in the same manner that industry approaches the innovation process.
Economists use real options theory on patents in conjunction with their analysis of
companies' research and development strategies.17° The same way R&D spending has
real option qualities, so do patents.
From this, economists have noted how many companies-explicitly or implicitlyfollow ROR when pursuing certain technological development projects. Rita McGrath
and Atul Nerkar note that pharmaceutical firms take a real options approach to their
research and development investment. These companies "implicitly (or explicitly)
respon[ d] to the value of the right to preserve decision rights in the future in their
investment choices." 171
Patents are meant to further technological progress. The classical theory is that
patents create an incentive to invent-that is, engage in the innovation process-because
they provide a mechanism by which the inventor can recoup her research and
development costs. 172 If patents are supposed to influence the development process for

Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 57-58
(2008) (arguing that KSR will lead to more patent grants because of the indeterminacy it introduces).
166. See supra Part III.A.
167. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11

SUP. CT. ECON. REV. I, 41 (2004).
168. Id.
169. The decision increases the "gap" needed between what has already been done-the state of technology
at the time of the invention-and the technological progress the invention represents. Christopher A. Cotropia,
Nonobviousness as an Exercise in Gap Measuring, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH
26 (P. Yu ed., 2007).
170. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 34.
171. McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 2, at 2.
172. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 3 n.4 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (noting that it is the
"expectation" that patent law facilitates the generation of "ex post rents" that provides the incentive to invent).
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the better, perhaps thinking about patents the same way industry does can lead to better
patent policy. Taking a real options perspective would also help link the economics
literature on patents as real options with the legal scholarship on patents.
C. Presents a New Theory ofPatents

The use of new economic concepts to describe the patent system is nothing new. For
example, Clarisa Long used information cost theory to describe patent (and copyright)
law.173 Paul Heald used the concept of transaction cost to describe a new theory of
patents.174 Both of these exercises provide a new descriptive account of the patent system
and introduce interesting policy and doctrinal implications as a result of the new
perspective.
Real options theory provides a similar opportunity. The concept of real optionsand the particular similarities between real options and patents-provides a framework to
produce new perspectives on patents, some of which are described in this Article. In
addition, the value of flexibility to patent owners-flexibility being a hallmark of a real
option-could provide interesting descriptive and normative insights into patent law. 175
Furthermore, the .fact that a real option becomes more valuable the more uncertain the
value of the underlying asset could have interesting implications for the situations under
which patent protection may be most valuable to industry and, in turn, valuable to
society.176 Finally, real options analysis could add a dimension to the theory of patents
focused on their private value, instead of their social value.177 These concepts need to be
fully explored to provide any value to other scholars. 178 However, the application of real
options theory to both patent problems and patent solutions in Part IV.A, above,
hopefully shows that such an exercise has promise.
V.

CONCLUSION

Real options theory has tremendous potential for both assisting in patent policy
discussions and expanding patent theory. This Article's goal was modest and exploratory
in nature. First, lay a foundation for future exploration of the patent as real option
analogy, and then provide a taste of the policy and theory implications such an analogy
presents. The hope is that future legal scholarship continuing the exploration of patents as
real options will follow.

173. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. R.Ev. 465, 495-538 (2004).
174. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005).
175. See COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 1, at 5~.
176. IAN AYERS, OPTIONAL LAW 2-3 (2005).
177. Thanks goes to Kevin Collins for this insight.
178. This is a project, including other areas of intellectual property law such as copyright and trademark,
upon which I am currently embarking and for which this article lays the necessary foundation.
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